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The  1999  round  of  trade  talks  in  Seattle,
Washington  got off to  a rather  shaky  start;  in
fact,  it may be  several  years before new  trade
talks  will  be  held.  Many  special-interest
groups,  including  environmentalists  and labor
unions,  were successful in scuttling these trade
talks.  In  addition,  agriculture's  role  and  posi-
tion were  not  clearly  stated.  This paper deals
specifically  with  key  agricultural  issues  sur-
rounding future progress  in trade  talks. These
comments integrate the central themes covered
by the  several  authors who participated  in the
session  entitled  "The  Millenium  Round  of
Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations."  My  discus-
sion illustrates  some of the outstanding  issues
which  must  be  dealt  with  before  significant
progress  will  be  made  towards  freer  trade  in
agriculture.
Policy  Harmonization
What  happened  to  policy  harmonization  as
agreed  to  under  CUSTA  and  NAFTA?  The
United  States  and  Canada  were  supposed  to
work  towards  a  common  agricultural  policy;
however,  this  has  not  happened.  In  fact,  the
two  countries  seem  to be  moving  in opposite
directions  in  the  policy  arena.  The  United
States  passed  the  1996  FAIR  Act  whereby
farmers  were  compensated  over  seven  years
for  support  received under previous  farm pro-
grams.  In  addition,  in  1999,  U.S.  farmers  re-
ceived  a  government  cash  bailout of over $8
billion. In 2000, it appears that significant pay-
ments  will  once again  be made  under various
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relief packages.  On the other hand,  in Canada
supply management remains  in place, as it has
for quite  some  time.  But for major  commod-
ities  such  as  wheat,  beef and  pork,  Canadian
subsidies  have  essentially  been  eliminated
(FAS  paper).  Key  subsidies,  including  the
Crow  Rate  transportation  subsidy,  were  re-
moved.  As  of February  2000,  it  appears  that
in spite of lobbying by farm groups in Western
Canada  little government  support will be pro-
vided  to farmers in Western Canada. Evidence
surrounding  policy  harmonization  suggests
that  even when  agreements  are  signed,  coun-
tries do not necessarily live up to those agree-
ments.  Why,  then, if further free  trade  agree-
ments  are  signed  for  agriculture  should  we
expect material results?
With the  removal  of the  Crow  Rate  trans-
portation  subsidy  in  Canada,  very  few  subsi-
dies remain for western Canadian farmers. The
removal  of the  Crow  was  certainly  a  victory
for tax payers,  since  the government  compen-
sation  package  paid  to  producers  was  much
lower  than  payments  made  under  the  Crow
rate agreement.  Producers  did not receive full
compensation  for  the  transfer  they  were  re-
ceiving  under  the Crow  rate.  The  removal  of
the Crow  was also  a victory for proponents  of
free  trade;  however,  many  argue  that  even  if
the Crow  had remained  in place, it would  not
have brought  a halt to trade talks.  They argue
further that the removal of the Crow was noth-
ing more than a budgetary decision on the part
of the Canadian  treasury.  With the  Crow  and
other  subsidies  eliminated,  Canada  is  left  to
compete  against countries,  such  as the United
States,  who  have  reintroduced  subsidies.  Is
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State  Trading Enterprises and the WTO
The paper  by the Foreign Agricultural Service
(FAS)  clearly  states  the American position on
freer trade concerning STEs:  the United States
wants  STEs  eliminated.  Two  thorny  issues
arise.  First,  the United  States  has  to consider
the role played by its own STE: the Commod-
ity  Credit  Corporation  (CCC).  At  times,  the
CCC's  activities  have  been  significant  in  in-
ternational  grain  marketing  (Schmitz,  Furtan
and  Baylis,  1999).  In  the  late  1990s,  because
of extremely  low  commodity  prices,  the CCC
again  emerged  as  a major  player. Second,  de-
spite  claims  to  the  contrary,  there  is  no  em-
pirical  evidence  available  to  suggest  that  the
Canadian  Wheat  Board-a major  STE-is in
violation  of WTO rules  (Schmitz,  Furtan  and
Baylis,  1999).
STEs  have  to  meet  certain  criteria  to  be
WTO  compliant.  One  important  criteria  con-
cerns  soft  price  discrimination  where  export
subsidies  are involved.  STEs can practice hard
price  discrimination  (which  doesn't  involve
subsidies).  Generally,  when  the  CWB  price
discriminates,  it practices  hard price  discrimi-
nation,  and  is  therefore  WTO  compliant.  In
addition,  regardless  of the nature  of price dis-
crimination,  and  whether  or  not  the  CWB  is
efficient  in  marketing,  the  trade-distorting  ef-
fects are  small indeed.  STEs  should be judged
on the extent  to  which  they  are  trade  distort-
ing,  rather  than  on  other  criteria  that are  es-
poused  in trade circles.
Keeping  the  Borders Open
While  there  is  general  agreement  that  major
countries and regions should continue pushing
for freer trade,  certain  apparent  contradictions
have  surfaced.  For  example,  Canada,  in  its
free  trade  stance,  is  unwilling  to give up  sup-
ply  management.  And  in  the  United  States,
dumping  and  countervail  laws  (in addition  to
farmer  subsidies  referred  to  earlier)  are  in
place  to  protect  U.S.  producers  from  foreign
competition.  Some  allege  that  the  United
States  is  arguing  for  free  trade  on  the  one
hand,  but practicing  protectionism  on  the oth-
er.  However, these allegations  may not be true.
For  example,  consider  the  countervail  and
dumping cases leveled by  U.S. beef producers
against Mexico  and Canada.
On October  1st,  1998, the Ranchers-Cattle-
men  Action  Legal  Foundation  announced
that-with  the support of the National  Farmers
Union,  more than  20 other  state and  local  or-
ganizations,  and nearly  8000 individual ranch-
ers-it had filed three petitions in Washington,
D.C.  with the U.S.  government  seeking  relief
from unfair trade practices.  If it is true that the
United States only preaches free trade but does
not practice  it, then the countervail and dump-
ing  cases  against  Canada  would  have  been
successful.  However,  the cases  were  resolved
in  1999 in favor of Canada.  This decision was
certainly  a victory for Canadian beef interests,
and a victory for U.S. proponents  of free trade.
As  well,  the  injection  of  over  $8  billion  in
1999  into  the  farm  economy  in  the  form  of
government  disaster  relief payments  is  not  in
violation  of  the  U.S.'s  stance  on  free  trade,
though  it may at first glance  appear to be. The
bailout  is  likely  to  be  considered  a  "green
box"  policy  by WTO  rules  (see  below);  that
is  to say the bailout,  under WTO rules, is pro-
duction  and trade  neutral.
Agricultural Policy  Categories
Agricultural  policies  have been separated  into
multiple categories:  blue, green,  amber, or red,
according  to  their  trade  distorting  impacts.
Green  box  policies  are  not  actionable  for
countervailing  duties or other GATT challeng-
es.  Ultimately,  green  box  criteria  ensure  that
policies  and programs in the category are pro-
duction and  trade neutral.
According  to  Agriculture  and  Agri-Food
Canada  (1998a  and  1998b),  there  are  two
types  of  domestic  support  policies:  those
which  are  subject  to  reduction  commitment
and those  which  are  exempt.  Exempt  policies
include green box programs  and blue box pro-
grams.
Green Box Policies
Two basic criteria apply in Green box policies:
(1)  Support  must  be  government  funded  and
216Schmitz:  The  Millennium Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(2)  the  money  cannot  provide  price  support.
In  addition  to  these  criteria,  a  number  of  il-
lustrative  programs  are  given:  research,  in-
spection,  extension  and  training,  marketing
and  promotion,  public  stock  holding  for food
security;  domestic food aid; and decoupled in-
come support, income insurance  and safety net
programs,  structural  adjustment  assistance, re-
gional  assistance  and environmental  aids.
Blue Box Policies
Acceptable,  but temporary,  Blue box  policies
include program payments received under pro-
duction  limiting  programs-based  on  fixed
area  and  yields,  a  fixed  number  of head  of
livestock,  or if they  are  made  on  85  percent
or less of base  level of production.
Those  programs  which  do  not  fit  these
three categories  are  subject to  reduction com-
mitment.  For  these  non-exempt  programs,  a
quantitative  measure  of the  level  of interven-
tion is calculated using an Aggregate Measure
of Support  (AMS).  Developed  country  WTO
members  are required  to reduce their AMS  to
80  percent of their  1986-88  levels by  2000.
Amber Box Policies
Amber  box  policies  are  trade-distorting  do-
mestic  support programs that are subject to re-
duction  commitments  (such  as  market  price
support  and  input subsidies).
Red Box Policies
Red box policies are prohibited policies. There
is  no  agreement  on how  to  apply  the  "stop"
red light  to any domestic policies,  so the "red
box"  has been empty.
During  the Uruguay  Round  of trade  nego-
tiations a number of authors attempted to clas-
sify domestic  support policies based on the de-
gree  to  which  they  distort  trade;  however,
certain  policies  do  not fit neatly  into  the  cat-
egories  (Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada,
1998a  and  1998b).  For example,  according  to
Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada,  it  is dif-
ficult to assign  the Canadian program NISA a
precise spot within the green part of the green-
red spectrum.  The program is not entirely neu-
tral,  since additional government contributions
can  be  obtained  through  additional  sales.  The
U.S.  PFC program  is  also hard to  categorize.
Concerns  surrounding  the PFC  program  stem
from the large dollar amounts of the payments,
the  expectation  that  production  may  now  be
required  for  a  future  program,  and the  recent
use  of  the  program  to  provide  additional  ad
hoc transfers to producers.  Clearly, E.U.  com-
pensatory  payments  cannot  be  considered
"green"  as  they  now  stand,  according  to  an
Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada  report
(1998b),  An  Examination  of Nearly  Green
Programs: Case  Studies  For Canada,  The
United States and the European Union.
Although  green box programs are more be-
nign  than  other  forms  of  support,  it  is  clear
that large ongoing payments, by their size and
permanence,  attract and keep  resources in ag-
riculture.  As the  green  box  becomes  a  more
popular  avenue  for  governments  to  provide
domestic  support,  the  size  of the  expenditure
envelope  will expand and the potential distor-
tions  will increase  accordingly.  Moreover,  al-
though programs  may be  designed to  be pro-
duction  neutral,  they  are  not  always  so  in
practice.  Even though a program may be only
marginally  distorting,  large program  expendi-
tures  may  turn  a  small  distortion  into  a  big
impact.  This raises the need for a cap  on total
green  box  spending,  possibly combined  with
a cap  on each element of the green  box.
Given  the  criteria  spelled  out  above,  we
must ask: Do major farm policies fit within the
green box? For example,  does the $8.7  billion
bailout  of  U.S.  farmers  in  1999  fit  into  the
green box? The majority of policy analysts are
silent on this  issue.  I  would argue  that if this
program  significantly  distorts  international
trade,  then  it does  not  fit  the  green  box cate-
gory. It is my opinion that it is essentially im-
possible  to  carry  out  decoupled  farm  pro-
grams.  Farmers  use  government  payments  in
production  decisions.  These  payments  essen-
tially  increase  the  price  of  the  commodities
farmers produce  (our surveys show that a dol-
lar  transfer  from  the  government  translated
into a 75-cent increase in the price of the com-
modity  produced).  As  a  result,  production  is
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influenced  by government transfers, and there-
fore  trade is distorted  as  a result.
Multinationals and Trade Options
A  significant  volume  of international  trade  is
now  conducted  by  multinationals,  whereby
firms  not  only  trade  a  given  product  but  are
involved  in producing the commodity  in many
countries around  the  world.  This  fact has im-
portant implications  for freeing up internation-
al agricultural  trade. Consider, for the moment,
the case discussed  above in  which the  United
States  brought  charges  against  Canada under
U.S. countervail  and dumping  laws. Perhaps  a
reason why the United States ruled in favor of
Canada  was because  of lobbying by  multina-
tionals  to  keep  the  border  open,  given  that
multinationals  in  the  United  States  would  be
hurt if the  ruling  went  in  favor  of U.S.  beef
producers.  The  majority  of beef cattle  fed  in
Canada  are  fed  in  Alberta.  A  major  packing
plant  in  Brooks,  Alberta  is  owned  by  Iowa
Beef Packers  Incorporated  (IBP).  In  addition,
a world-class  beef-packing  plant in High Riv-
er,  Alberta is  owned  by Cargill,  Incorporated
under  the name of Excel.  Clearly,  closing  the
borders  to Canadian  beef exports  would  have
a  significant negative  impact on the profit pic-
ture  for these multinationals.
Multinationals  continue  to  influence  U.S.
sugar  policy,  which  continues  to  be  in  the
news.  The  key  component  of sugar  policy  is
the use of import  quotas which restrict the im-
portation  of  refined  and  raw  sugar  into  the
U.S.  market.  Support  for  this  program  varies
by producer  group (Schmitz  and Moss,  1999).
For  example,  it  appears  that  the  U.S.  Sugar
Corporation  (a  major  sugar producer  in Flor-
ida)  supports  more  restrictive  import  quotas
than  does Flo-Sun  (which produces  in Florida
and  in  the  Dominican  Republic).  Flo-Sun
ships sugar  from the Dominican  Republic into
the U.S.  under preferential  quota treatment, re-
ceiving  the  internal  U.S.  sugar  price  for  ex-
ports.  Therefore,  they attempt to maximize re-
turns  jointly  from  domestic  production  and
from  production  in  the  Dominican  Republic.
To do  this,  they want  a certain  volume  of im-
ports  to  enter  the  U.S.  duty-free.  The  quota
levels which Flo-Sun supports  are above those
that  the  U.S.  Sugar  Corporation  supports,
largely  because  the latter produces  sugar only
in the United  States.
Vertical  Markets and Trade
Many sectors  are now becoming  vertically in-
tegrated  either  through  direct  contracts  be-
tween  processors  and  growers,  or  by  direct
ownership  of  all  stages  from  production  to
marketing.  Perhaps  this  increasing  degree  of
integration  favors  lobbying  activities  for  free
trade.  On the other hand,  where  vertical  inte-
gration  is not present,  key players  in the mar-
keting  chain with both economic  and political
clout  can block  trade reform.  For example,  in
the production and marketing of cotton in Tur-
key,  there  is  very  little  vertical  coordination.
A  major cotton textile  mill is owned privately
and  buys  the  majority  of  its  cotton  on  the
Turkish  cotton  exchange.  When  examining
cotton policy  in Turkey,  it is clear that protec-
tionist  trade  instruments  (such  as  export  sub-
sidies, taxes, and import quotas on raw cotton)
are in place which maximize returns to the pri-
vate  processing  sector  (Schmitz  et al.,  1999).
It appears  that  lobbying efforts  could take  on
a  different  direction  if the  degree  of  vertical
coordination  were  increased  in  the  Turkish
cotton  sector.
The importance  of the structure of vertical
markets  on  trade  can be  further seen  with re-
spect to the U.S.  sugar industry. Both Flo-Sun
and the U.S.  Sugar Corporation can handle ad-
ditional raw-sugar imports  since they have the
capacity  to refine raw sugar,  which is not true
for major  sugar beet producers  nor for  sugar-
cane  producers  in  Louisiana.  Therefore  the
opening up  of trade  would have a less serious
impact on these  firms  than  it would  on  sugar
beet  producers  and  sugarcane  producers  in
Louisiana.  The  latter  does  not  own  any  sug-
arcane  refining capacity.
What Must Be  Given  Up?
In negotiating  for freer trade  in agriculture,  it
is not  clear what individual  countries are will-
ing  to  give  up.  Consider Canada  for  the mo-
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ment:  if  supply  management  is  to  remain  in
place,  then Canada has very few  chips to bar-
gain  with,  since  all  of the  remaining  sectors
are not subsidized  to any significant extent. On
the issue of supply management,  there are sig-
nificant  gains  from  trade  if this  system  were
eliminated;  however,  this  would  require  com-
pensation  to producers  which  would  approxi-
mate the transfers  producers  currently receive
from consumers.  Given the political climate in
Canada and the frustrating experience of West-
ern  Canadian producers  with respect  to trans-
fers  from  the federal  government,  compensa-
tion  appears unlikely.
It  is  clear  that  there  is  a  great  deal  to  be
gained by non-E.U.  countries if the European
Union  gives up  subsidies, but the problem re-
mains:  unless compensation  is actually paid to
losers in the move  to freer trade then very  lit-
tle  will  happen in trade negotiations.
In terms of the United States we must con-
sider whether or not it will give up sugar, pea-
nut,  tobacco,  or  dairy  programs?  Likely  not,
unless  compensation  schemes  are  devised.
Would the United  States terminate bailout pro-
grams?  In view of the above, while it is inter-
esting political rhetoric  to argue that the world
has  a  great  deal  to  gain  from  freer  trade  in
agriculture,  achieving  freer  trade  in reality  is
a  different  matter.  A  significant  question  re-
mains:  Who wants  free trade  anyway?
The Theory of Public  Choice  and Rent
Seeking
Policy decisions  are clearly  influenced by rent
seeking.  Effective rent seekers  are able to con-
vince politicians  that they  need  financial  sup-
port  regardless  of  the impact  of such  support
on  trade  and  the  environment.  U.S.  farmers
were  successful  in  lobbying  government  to
change the  1996  farm program  in  their favor,
particularly  when,  in  1999,  an  $8.7  billion
bailout  was  added  to  farmers'  coffers.  The
U.S.  government  is  once  again  heavily  in-
volved  in  U.S.  agriculture.  This  involvement
should  not be  surprising  given the  theory  of
rent seeking and public  choice.  Politicians'  re-
sponse  to  lobbying  is  largely  a  function  of
whether  or not they  can  win votes.
This  is  clearly  demonstrated  concerning
policy harmonization between Canada and the
United States (see above).  For example,  wheat
farmers  on the Canadian  prairies, unlike  those
in the United States, have recently been unable
to lobby the federal government effectively for
support in view of extremely  low  wheat pric-
es. This was not true for the early  1990s when
the level of support for Canadian prairie farm-
ers  was  at  least  as  high  as  support  levels  for
American  farmers.  Why  is  support  now  not
forthcoming?  The  answer  seems  clear:  sup-
porting  prairie  farmers  generates  very  few
votes.
The  present  Canadian  federal  government
is  a  Liberal  government,  while  the  Alberta
provincial  government  is  Conservative.  Sas-
katchewan  and Manitoba  are  governed  by the
New Democratic  Party.  There  are few elected
Liberals  from the  West in  the  current  federal
government.  (Remember that when the federal
government  provided  high  support  levels  in
the late  1980s  and early  1990s,  a Progressive
Conservative  government was  in place  in Ot-
tawa and in Saskatchewan.)  Unless the Liberal
government felt that it could obtain additional
votes in future elections through farm support,
it  likely  will  not  subsidize  western  farmers.
The Liberal government  clearly  supports  sup-
ply  management,  whose primary activities are
located in eastern  Canada:  Quebec  and Ontar-
io  specifically  (Schmitz  and  Schmitz,  1994;
Schmitz,  1995).  There are  also those  who  ar-
gue  that the Ottawa civil servants who  advise
the  federal  Minister  of Agriculture,  including
those  in  Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada,
are  not in favor of providing  significant trans-
fers  to Western  Canada.  Both arguments  com-
bined-the  political  and  the  economic-sug-
gest  why  Western  Canada  is  not  likely  to
obtain  significant  transfers  from  the  federal
government at anywhere  close to U.S.  subsidy
levels.
Conclusions
In order to make future progress towards freer
trade  in  agriculture,  policy  harmonization
among  countries  has  to  be  dealt  with.  The
NAFTA  and  CUSTA  agreements  should  be
219Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2000
enforced.  In addition,  analysis is badly needed
on  the  impact  of the  Free  Trade  Area  of the
Americas  accord  on  North American  agricul-
ture.  Freeing  up  trade  among  the  countries
comprising  this  block  could  have  significant
impact  on  U.S.  agriculture.  However,  given
the  political  climate  and  the  mood  which
seems  to  be  moving  nations  towards  protec-
tionism,  actual  compensation  will  likely need
to be paid to those who stand to lose from free
trade  before they  will join the bandwagon.
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